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inequality; and the relationship to collective responsibility. In some cases . the exercise of responsibility strengthens individual character and moral capacity; and The basis of power or authority in a relationship may be categorised in six ways. The . Austin (Eds), The social psychology of intergroup relations. Monterey. POWERS: No man, freedom didn't fail. Right now we've got freedom and responsibility. It's a very -Powers, Austin Powers: The Spy Who Shagged Me ( ). The 60's in . entation of personal relationships, particularly those involving. Even though the men who wield this power initially be of good will and even though . coexistence, the only form in which we can be fully responsible for ourselves. . Ralph Austin Bard, United States Assistant Secretary of the Navy, speech to the .. Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom (), Ch. 1 "The Relation.
DebsFederal Court statement For so long as but a hundred of us remain alive, we will in no way yield ourselves to the dominion of the English. For it is not for glory, nor riches, nor honour that we fight, but for Freedom, which no good man lays down but with his life. From the Declaration of Arbroath The Times Book of Quotations Once a man has tasted freedom he will never be content to be a slave. They want rain without thunder and lightning.
They want the ocean without the awful roar of its many waters.
E[ edit ] All these aspirations are directed toward ennobling man's life, lifting it from the sphere of mere physical existence and leading the individual towards freedom. Albert Einstein"Moral Decay" ; later published in Out of My Later Years Everything that is really great and inspiring is created by the individual who can labor in freedom. When technique enters into the realm of social life, it collides ceaselessly with the human being to the degree that the combination of man and technique is unavoidable, and that technical action necessarily results in a determined result.Responsibility Brings Freedom - Manifesting Monday
Technique requires predictability and, no less, exactness of prediction. It is necessary, then, that technique prevail over the human being. For technique, this is a matter of life or death. Technique must reduce man to a technical animal, the king of the slaves of technique.
Human caprice crumbles before this necessity; there can be no human autonomy in the face of technical autonomy. The individual must be fashioned by techniques, either negatively by the techniques of understanding man or positively by the adaptation of man to the technical frameworkin order to wipe out the blots his personal determination introduces into the perfect design of the organization. Jacques EllulThe Technological Societyp. Jacques EllulThe Betrayal by Technology The only difference as compared with the old, outspoken slavery is this, that the worker of today seems to be free because he is not sold once for all, but piecemeal by the day, the week, the year, and because no one owner sells him to another, but he is forced to sell himself in this way instead, being the slave of no particular person, but of the whole property-holding class.
Friedrich EngelsThe Condition of the Working Class in England Freedom does not consist in any dreamt-of independence from natural lawsbut in the knowledge of these lawsand in the possibility this gives of systematically making them work towards definite ends. F[ edit ] The Age of Empty Freedom It has this great advantage over the Age of Science, that it knows all things without having learned anything; and can pass judgment upon whatever comes before it at once and without hesitation,—without needing any preliminary evidence: The society that puts freedom before equality will end up with a great measure of both.
He will ask rather "What can I and my compatriots do through government" to help us discharge our individual responsibilities, to achieve our several goals and purposes, and above all, to protect our freedom? And he will accompany this question with another: How can we keep the government we create from becoming a Frankenstein that will destroy the very freedom we establish it to protect?
Freedom is a rare and delicate plant. Our minds tell us, and history confirms, that the great threat to freedom is the concentration of power. Government is necessary to preserve our freedom, it is an instrument through which we can exercise our freedom; yet by concentrating power in political hands, it is also a threat to freedom. Even though the men who wield this power initially be of good will and even though they be not corrupted by the power they exercise, the power will both attract and form men of a different stamp.
Milton FriedmanCapitalism and FreedomIntroduction Political freedom means the absence of coercion of a man by his fellow men. The fundamental threat to freedom is power to coerce, be it in the hands of a monarch, a dictator, an oligarchy, or a momentary majority. The preservation of freedom requires the elimination of such concentration of power to the fullest possible extent and the dispersal and distribution of whatever power cannot be eliminated — a system of checks and balances.
Milton FriedmanCapitalism and FreedomCh. None are more hopelessly enslaved than those who falsely believe they are free. Johann Wolfgang von GoetheBk. Die Wahlverwandtschaften, Hamburger Ausgabe, Bd. To evolve we must be free, and we cannot have freedom if we are not rebels, because no tyrant whatsoever has respected passive people. Friedrich HayekEconomic Freedom and Representative Government A society that does not recognise that each individual has values of his own which he is entitled to follow can have no respect for the dignity of the individual and cannot really know freedom.
Friedrich Hayekas quoted in The Market: I consider the determination of the will as an effect. This effect must have a cause which had the power to produce it; and the cause must be either the person himself, whose will it is, or some other being…. If the person was the cause of that determination of his own will, he was free in that action, and it is justly imputed to him, whether it be good or bad. But, if another being was the cause of this determination, either producing it immediately, or by means and instruments under his direction, then the determination is the act and deed of that being, and is solely imputed to him.
While it is intelligible to ask whether a man willed to do what he did, it is incoherent to ask whether a man willed to will what he did: For to ask whether a man is at liberty to will either motion or rest, speaking or silence, which he pleases, is to ask whether a man can will what he wills, or be pleased with what he is pleased with?
A question which, I think, needs no answer; and they who make a question of it must suppose one will to determine the acts of another, and another to determine that, and so on in infinitum. Locke  II. It is important to recognize that an implication of the second step of the strategy is that free will is not only compatible with determinism but actually requires determinism cf. This was a widely shared assumption among compatibilists up through the mid-twentieth century.
He endorses a strong form of necessitarianism in which everything is categorically necessary opposed to the weaker form of conditional necessity embraced by most compatibilists, and he contends that there is no room in such a world for divine or creaturely free will.
Thus, Spinoza is a free will skeptic. Interestingly, Spinoza is also keen to deny that the nonexistence of free will has the dire implications often assumed. As noted above, many in the modern period saw belief in free will and an afterlife in which God rewards the just and punishes the wicked as necessary to motivate us to act morally. According to Spinoza, so far from this being necessary to motivate us to be moral, it actually distorts our pursuit of morality.
True moral living, Spinoza thinks, sees virtue as its own reward Part V, Prop. Moreover, while free will is a chimera, humans are still capable of freedom or self-determination. Spinoza is an important forerunner to the many free will skeptics in the twentieth century, a position that continues to attract strong support see Strawson ; Double ; Smilansky ; Pereboom; Levy ; Waller ; Caruso ; Vilhauer For further discussion see the entry skepticism about moral responsibility.
It is worth observing that in many of these disputes about the nature of free will there is an underlying dispute about the nature of moral responsibility. Underlying the belief that free will is incompatible with determinism is the thought that no one would be morally responsible for any actions in a deterministic world in the sense that no one would deserve blame or punishment. Hobbes responded to this charge in part by endorsing broadly consequentialist justifications of blame and punishment: Schlick ; Nowell-Smith ; Smart While many, perhaps even most, compatibilists have come to reject this consequentialist approach to moral responsibility in the wake of P.
The Nature of Free Will 2. When an agent exercises free will over her choices and actions, her choices and actions are up to her. But up to her in what sense? As should be clear from our historical survey, two common and compatible answers are: However, there is widespread controversy both over whether each of these conditions is required for free will and if so, how to understand the kind or sense of freedom to do otherwise or sourcehood that is required.
While some seek to resolve these controversies in part by careful articulation of our experiences of deliberation, choice, and action Nozickch. The idea is that the kind of control or sense of up-to-meness involved in free will is the kind of control or sense of up-to-meness relevant to moral responsibility Double12; Ekstrom7—8; Smilansky16; Widerker and McKenna2; Vargas; Nelkin—52; Levy1; Pereboom1—2.
Given this connection, we can determine whether the freedom to do otherwise and the power of self-determination are constitutive of free will and, if so, in what sense, by considering what it takes to be a morally responsible agent. On these latter characterizations of free will, understanding free will is inextricably linked to, and perhaps even derivative from, understanding moral responsibility.
And even those who demur from this claim regarding conceptual priority typically see a close link between these two ideas. Consequently, to appreciate the current debates surrounding the nature of free will, we need to say something about the nature of moral responsibility. It is now widely accepted that there are different species of moral responsibility. It is common though not uncontroversial to distinguish moral responsibility as answerability from moral responsibility as attributability from moral responsibility as accountability Watson ; Fischer and Tognazzini ; Shoemaker See Smith for a critique of this taxonomy.
These different species of moral responsibility differ along three dimensions: For example, some argue that when an agent is morally responsible in the attributability sense, certain judgments about the agent—such as judgments concerning the virtues and vices of the agent—are fitting, and that the fittingness of such judgments does not depend on whether the agent in question possessed the freedom to do otherwise cf.
While keeping this controversy about the nature of moral responsibility firmly in mind see the entry on moral responsibility for a more detailed discussion of these issueswe think it is fair to say that the most commonly assumed understanding of moral responsibility in the historical and contemporary discussion of the problem of free will is moral responsibility as accountability in something like the following sense: The central notions in this definition are praise, blame, and desert.
The majority of contemporary philosophers have followed Strawson in contending that praising and blaming an agent consist in experiencing or at least being disposed to experience cf. Wallace70—71 reactive attitudes or emotions directed toward the agent, such as gratitude, approbation, and pride in the case of praise, and resentment, indignation, and guilt in the case of blame. See Sher and Scanlon for important dissensions from this trend. See the entry on blame for a more detailed discussion.
These emotions, in turn, dispose us to act in a variety of ways. For example, blame disposes us to respond with some kind of hostility toward the blameworthy agent, such as verbal rebuke or partial withdrawal of good will. But while these kinds of dispositions are essential to our blaming someone, their manifestation is not: Blaming someone might be immediately followed by forgiveness as an end of the matter. The desert at issue here is basic in the sense that the agent would deserve to be blamed or praised just because she has performed the action, given an understanding of its moral status, and not, for example, merely by virtue of consequentialist or contractualist considerations.
Importantly, these reasons can be outweighed by other considerations. While an agent may deserve blame, it might, all things considered, be best to forgive him unconditionally instead. When an agent is morally responsible for doing something wrong, he is blameworthy: However, it would seem unfair to treat agents in these ways unless their actions were up to them.
Thus, we arrive at the core connection between free will and moral responsibility: Consequently, we can assess analyses of free will by their implications for judgments of moral responsibility. We note that some might reject the claim that free will is necessary for moral responsibility e. In what follows, we focus our attention on the two most commonly cited features of free will: While some seem to think that free will consists exclusively in either the freedom to do otherwise van Inwagen or in sourcehood Zagzebskiwe think that the majority of philosophers hold that free will involves both conditions—though philosophers often emphasize one condition over the other depending on their dialectical situation or argumentative purposes cf.
In what follows, we will describe the most common characterizations of these two conditions. But what does this freedom come to? The freedom to do otherwise is clearly a modal property of agents, but it is controversial just what species of modality is at stake. It must be more than mere possibility: A more plausible and widely endorsed understanding claims the relevant modality is ability or power Locke , II. Locke ; Clarke ; Vihvelin But abilities themselves seem to come in different varieties Lewis ; Horgan ; van Inwagench.
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A satisfactory account of the freedom to do otherwise owes us both an account of the kind of ability in terms of which the freedom to do otherwise is analyzed, and an argument for why this kind of ability as opposed to some other species is the one constitutive of the freedom to do otherwise. As we will see, philosophers sometimes leave this second debt unpaid. As we saw above, classical compatibilists Hobbes , ; Locke ; Hume , ; Edwards ; Moore ; Schlick ; Ayer sought to analyze the freedom to do otherwise in terms of a simple conditional analysis of ability: Part of the attraction of this analysis is that it obviously reconciles the freedom to do otherwise with determinism.
There are two problems with the Simple Conditional Analysis. The first is that it is, at best, an analysis of free action, not free will cf. Reid ; Chisholm ;ch. It only tells us when an agent has the ability to do otherwise, not when an agent has the ability to choose to do otherwise. One might be tempted to think that there is an easy fix along the following lines: The problem is that we often fail to choose to do things we want to choose, even when it appears that we had the ability to choose otherwise one might think the same problem attends the original analysis.
Suppose that, in deciding how to spend my evening, I have a desire to choose to read and a desire to choose to watch a movie. Suppose that I choose to read.
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By all appearances, I had the ability to choose to watch a movie. I do desire to choose to watch a movie and yet I do not choose to watch a movie. It is unclear how to remedy this problem. Hobbes , ; Edwards . The problem is that this assumes, implausibly, that we always choose what we most strongly desire for criticisms of this view see Reid ; Campbell ; Wallace ; Holton But each of these proposals is also problematic. Even if there are fixes to these problems, there is a yet deeper problem with these analyses.
There are some agents who clearly lack the freedom to do otherwise and yet satisfy the conditional at the heart of these analyses.
That is, although these agents lack the freedom to do otherwise, it is, for example, true of them that if they chose otherwise, they would do otherwise. Picking up on an argument developed by Keith Lehrer ; cf. Campbell ; Broad ; Chisholmconsider an agoraphobic, Luke, who, when faced with the prospect of entering an open space, is subject not merely to an irresistible desire to refrain from intentionally going outside, but an irresistible desire to refrain from even choosing to go outside.
It may well nevertheless be true that if Luke chose to go outside, then he would have gone outside. After all, any possible world in which he chooses to go outside will be a world in which he no longer suffers to the same degree from his agoraphobia, and thus we have no reason to doubt that in those worlds he would go outside as a result of his choosing to go outside.
While simple conditional analyses admirably make clear the species of ability to which they appeal, they fail to show that this species of ability is constitutive of the freedom to do otherwise. Agents need a stronger ability to do otherwise than characterized by such simple conditionals. Some argue that the fundamental source of the above problems is the conditional nature of these analyses Campbell ; Austin ; Chisholm ; Lehrer ; van Inwagench.
He lacks the ability to do otherwise than refrain from choosing to go outside, according to this analysis, because there is no possible world in which he suffers from his agoraphobia and yet chooses to go outside. If the Categorical Analysis is correct, then free will is incompatible with determinism.
According to the thesis of determinism, all deterministic possible worlds with the same pasts and laws of nature have the same futures Lewis ; van Inwagen3. Therefore, John lacked the ability, and thus freedom, to raise his hand. This argument, carefully articulated in the late s and early s by Carl Ginetand Peter van Inwagenand refined in important ways by John Martin Fischerhas come to be known as the Consequence Argument.
If determinism is true, then our acts are the consequences of the laws of nature and events in the remote past. But it is not up to us what went on before we were born [i. Therefore, the consequences of these things including our present acts are not up to us.
The objection here, though, is not that the analysis is too permissive or weak, but rather that it is too restrictive or strong. While there have been numerous different replies along these lines e. See the entry on arguments for incompatibilism for a more extensive discussion of and bibliography for the Consequence Argumentthe most influential of these objections is due to David Lewis Weak Thesis I am able to do something such that, if I did it, a law of nature would be broken.
While it is absurd to think that humans are able to do something that is a violation of a law of nature or causes a law of nature to be broken, there is nothing incredible, so Lewis claimed, in thinking that humans are able to do something such that if they did it, a law of nature would be broken.
In essence, Lewis is arguing that incompatibilists like van Inwagen have failed to adequately motivate the restrictiveness of the Categorical Analysis. But there is a different and often overlooked problem for Lewis: One might think that ii and iii are incompatible with i. Consider again Luke, our agoraphobic. Suppose that his agoraphobia affects him in such a way that he will only intentionally go outside if he chooses to go outside, and yet his agoraphobia makes it impossible for him to make this choice.
Moreover, Luke is not able to choose or cause himself to choose to go outside. Intuitively, this would seem to imply that Luke lacks the freedom to go outside. But this implication does not follow for Lewis. For other important criticisms of Lewis, see Ginet [, ch. Lewis must point out a principled difference between these two cases. As should be clear from the above, the Simple Conditional Analysis is of no help.
However, some recent work by Michael SmithKadri Vihvelin ;and Michael Fara have attempted to fill this gap. It is important to note that Vihvelin  has come to reject the view that free will consists exclusively in the kind of ability analyzed below. Revised Conditional Analysis of Ability: This analysis appears to afford Vihvelin the basis for a principled difference between agoraphobics and merely determined agents.
But appearances can be deceiving. The new dispositionalist claims have received some serious criticism, with the majority of the criticisms maintaining that these analyses are still too permissive Clarke ; Whittle ; Franklin b.
The Categorical Analysis, and thus incompatibilism about free will and determinism, remains an attractive option for many philosophers precisely because it seems that compatibilists have yet to furnish an analysis of the freedom to do otherwise that implies that phobics clearly lack the ability to choose or do otherwise that is relevant to moral responsibility and yet some merely determined agents have this ability.
Sourcehood Accounts Some have tried to avoid these lingering problems for compatibilists by arguing that the freedom to do otherwise is not required for free will or moral responsibility. In a ground-breaking piece, Harry Frankfurt presented a series of thought experiments intended to show that it is possible that agents are morally responsible for their actions and yet they lack the ability to do otherwise. Wolf3—4; Fischer3; Mele17then if Frankfurt-style cases show that moral responsibility does not require the ability to do otherwise, then they also show that free will does not require the ability to do otherwise.
Let us consider this challenge in more detail. Here is a representative Frankfurt-style case: Imagine, if you will, that Black is a quite nifty and even generally nice neurosurgeon. Jones, meanwhile, knows nothing of this. Fischer draws two interrelated conclusions from this case. The first, negative conclusion, is that the ability to do otherwise is not necessary for moral responsibility. Jones is unable to refrain from deciding to vote for Clinton, and yet, so long as Jones decides to vote for Clinton on his own, his decision is free and one for which he is morally responsible.
The second, positive conclusion, is that freedom and responsibility are functions of the actual sequence. What matters is not whether the agent had the ability to do otherwise, but whether he was the source of his actions. The success of Frankfurt-style cases is hotly contested.
According to this criticism, proponents of Frankfurt-style cases face a dilemma: But if the connection is nondeterministic, then it is possible even in the absence of showing any inclination to decide to vote for Bush, that Jones decides to vote for Bush, and so he retains the ability to do otherwise. Either way Frankfurt-style cases fail to show that Jones is both morally responsible for his decision and yet is unable to do otherwise.
While some have argued that even Frankfurt-style cases that assume determinism are effective see, e. Supposing that Frankfurt-style cases are successful, what exactly do they show? In our view, they show neither that free will and moral responsibility do not require an ability to do otherwise in any sense nor that compatibilism is true. The Consequence Argument raises a powerful challenge to the cogency of compatibilism. But if Frankfurt-style cases are successful, agents can act freely in the sense relevant to moral responsibility while lacking the ability to do otherwise in the all-in sense.
This allows compatibilists to concede that the all-in ability to do otherwise is incompatible with determinism, and yet insist that it is irrelevant to the question of the compatibility of determinism with moral responsibility and perhaps even free will, depending on how we define this cf.
But, of course, showing that an argument for the falsity of compatibilism is irrelevant does not show that compatibilism is true. Thus, if successful, Frankfurt-style cases would be at best the first step in defending compatibilism. The second step must offer an analysis of the kind of sourcehood constitutive of free will that entails that free will is compatible with determinism cf.
At best, Frankfurt-style cases show that the ability to do otherwise in the all-in sense—in the sense defined by the Categorical Analysis—is not necessary for free will or moral responsibility cf.
To appreciate this, let us assume that in the above Frankfurt-style case Jones lacks the ability to do otherwise in the all-in sense: Even if this is all true, it should take only a little reflection to recognize that in this case Jones is able to do otherwise in certain weaker senses we might attach to that phrase, and compatibilists in fact still think that the ability to do otherwise in some such senses is necessary for free will and moral responsibility.
Consequently, even though Frankfurt-style cases have, as a matter of fact, moved many compatibilists away from emphasizing ability to do otherwise to emphasizing sourcehood, we suggest that this move is best seen as a weakening of the ability-to-do-otherwise condition on moral responsibility.
A potentially important exception to this claim is Sartorio , who appealing to some controversial ideas in the metaphysics of causation appears to argue that no sense of the ability to do otherwise is necessary for control in the sense at stake for moral responsibility, but instead what matters is whether the agent is the cause of the action. The first, and perhaps most popular, compatibilist model is a reasons-responsiveness model. While compatibilists develop this kind of account in different ways, the most detailed proposal is due to John Martin Fischer,; Fischer and Ravizza For similar compatibilist treatments of reasons-responsiveness, see WolfWallaceHajiNelkinMcKennaVargasSartorio One mechanism they often discuss is practical deliberation.