Is the U.S.-Israel relationship in danger? - Israel News - Jerusalem Post
and special relationship between Israel and the United States is multifaceted . end of the s, an inchoate U.S.-Israeli alliance had emerged, sealed by the. Why the US and Israel have had such a close relationship for so long. to Netanyahu reflects a growing partisan gap inside the United States. US President Donald Trump has steadfastly backed Israel at the UN, moved “ You have a party in the United States that is wildly pro-Israel,”.
We want to keep our journalism open and accessible and be able to keep providing you with news and analyses from the frontlines of Israel, the Middle East and the Jewish World. As one of our loyal readers, we ask you to be our partner. As a result, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has praised him effusively.
- Is the U.S.-Israel relationship in danger?
- The US-Israeli relationship faces a storm on the horizon
- Israel–United States relations
And it is not just Trump, it is the Republicans. The Republicans do not need to be told to be pro-Israel; the Democrats do. The problem, he said, is that they are all in their sixties and seventies, and there is not an equally ardent pro-Israel cadre among the marquee Democratic names in their thirties and forties.
But these are the people who have to go talk to [up-and-coming Democratic leaders] Kamala Harris and Gavin Newsom. That is their job. Their job is not to yell at Netanyahu for being close to the Republicans; their job is to get close to the Democrats. Poll after poll shows that grassroots support for Israel in the Republican Party outpaces that in the Democratic Party, even though Jews still vote overwhelmingly for Democrats.
Regarding the non-Jews, Abrams pointed out that Israel has been governed by a right-of-center government for the last 17 years. After Israel went on full nuclear alert and loaded their warheads into waiting planes, Nixon ordered the full scale commencement of a strategic airlift operation to deliver weapons and supplies to Israel; this last move is sometimes called "the airlift that saved Israel".
However, by the time the supplies arrived, Israel was gaining the upper hand. Kissinger realized the situation presented the United States with a tremendous opportunity—Egypt was totally dependent on the US to prevent Israel from destroying the army, which now had no access to food or water.
The position could be parlayed later into allowing the United States to mediate the dispute, and push Egypt out of Soviet influences. As a result, the United States exerted tremendous pressure on the Israelis to refrain from destroying the trapped army. In a phone call with Israeli ambassador Simcha DinitzKissinger told the ambassador that the destruction of the Egyptian Third Army "is an option that does not exist". The Egyptians later withdrew their request for support and the Soviets complied.
After the war, Kissinger pressured the Israelis to withdraw from Arab lands; this contributed to the first phases of a lasting Israeli-Egyptian peace. President Ford responded on 21 March by sending Prime Minister Rabin a letter stating that Israeli intransigence has complicated US worldwide interests, and therefore the administration will reassess its relations with the Israeli government. In addition, arms shipments to Israel halted. The reassessment crisis came to an end with the Israeli—Egyptian disengagement of forces agreement of 4 September With the May election of Likud 's Menachem Begin as prime minister, after 30 years of leading the Israeli government opposition, major changes took place regarding Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories.
U.S. Department of State
The two frameworks included in the Carter-initiated Camp David process were viewed by right-wing elements in Israel as creating US pressures on Israel to withdraw from the captured Palestinian territoriesas well as forcing it to take risks for the sake of peace with Egypt. It led to Israeli withdrawal from Sinai by Likud governments have since argued that their acceptance of full withdrawal from the Sinai as part of these accords and the eventual Egypt—Israel Peace Treaty fulfilled the Israeli pledge to withdraw from occupied territory.
Reagan administration — President Ronald Reagan meeting Israeli Ambassador to the United States Ephraim EvronIsraeli supporters expressed concerns early in the first Ronald Reagan term about potential difficulties in US—Israeli relations, in part because several Presidential appointees had ties or past business associations with key Arab countries for example, Secretaries Caspar Weinberger and George P.
Shultz were officers in the Bechtel Corporationwhich has strong links to the Arab world; see Arab lobby in the United States. However, President Reagan's personal support for Israel, and the compatibility between Israeli and Reagan perspectives on terrorismsecurity cooperation, and the Soviet threat, led to considerable strengthening in bilateral relations.
InWeinberger and Israeli Minister of Defense Ariel Sharon signed the Strategic Cooperation Agreementestablishing a framework for continued consultation and cooperation to enhance the national security of both countries. In Novemberthe two sides formed a Joint Political Military Groupwhich meets twice a year, to implement most provisions of that agreement. Joint air and sea military exercises began in Juneand the United States constructed two War Reserve Stock facilities in Israel to stockpile military equipment.
Although intended for American forces in the Middle East, the equipment can be transferred to Israeli use if necessary. US—Israeli ties strengthened during the second Reagan term. Israel was granted " major non-NATO ally " status ingiving it access to expanded weapons systems and opportunities to bid on US defense contracts. Since then all customs duties between the two trading partners have been eliminated. However, relations soured when Israel carried out Operation Operaan Israeli airstrike on the Osirak nuclear reactor in Baghdad.
Reagan suspended a shipment of military aircraft to Israel, and harshly criticized the action. Relations also soured during the Lebanon Warwhen the United States even contemplated sanctions to stop the Israeli Siege of Beirut. The US reminded Israel that weaponry provided by the US was to be used for defensive purposes only, and suspended shipments of cluster munitions to Israel. Although the war exposed some serious differences between Israeli and US policies, such as Israel's rejection of the Reagan peace plan of 1 Septemberit did not alter the Administration's favoritism for Israel and the emphasis it placed on Israel's importance to the United States.
But, despite the US—PLO dialogue, the Pollard spy case, and the Israeli rejection of the Shultz peace initiative in the spring ofpro-Israeli organizations in the United States characterized the Reagan Administration and the th Congress as the "most pro-Israel ever", and praised the positive overall tone of bilateral relations. President Bush raised the ire of the Likud government when he told a press conference on 3 Marchthat East Jerusalem was occupied territory and not a sovereign part of Israel as Israel says.
Israel had annexed East Jerusalem inan action which did not gain international recognition. The United States and Israel disagreed over the Israeli interpretation of the Israeli plan to hold elections for a Palestinian peace conference delegation in the summer ofand also disagreed over the need for an investigation of the Jerusalem incident of 8 Octoberin which Israeli police killed 17 Palestinians. The United States urged Israel not to retaliate against Iraq for the attacks because it was believed that Iraq wanted to draw Israel into the conflict and force other coalition members, Egypt and Syria in particular, to quit the coalition and join Iraq in a war against Israel.
Israel did not retaliate, and gained praise for its restraint. Following the Gulf War, the administration immediately returned to Arab-Israeli peacemaking, believing there was a window of opportunity to use the political capital generated by the US victory to revitalize the Arab-Israeli peace process.
On 6 MarchPresident Bush addressed Congress in a speech often cited as the administration's principal policy statement on the new order in relation to the Middle East, following the expulsion of Iraqi forces from Kuwait. The centerpiece of his program, however, was the achievement of an Arab—Israeli treaty based on the territory-for-peace principle and the fulfillment of Palestinian rights.
This was both because President Bush and Secretary Baker felt the coalition victory and increased US prestige would itself induce a new Arab—Israeli dialogue, and because their diplomatic initiative focused on process and procedure rather than on agreements and concessions. From Washington's perspective, economic inducements would not be necessary, but these did enter the process because Israel injected them in May.
It was reported widely that the Bush Administration did not share an amicable relationship with the Likud government of Yitzhak Shamir.
However, the Israeli government did win the repeal of United Nations General Assembly Resolutionwhich equated Zionism with racism. The Labor coalition approved a partial housing construction freeze in the occupied territories on 19 July, something the Shamir government had not done despite Bush Administration appeals for a freeze as a condition for the loan guarantees. Israel and the PLO exchanged letters of mutual recognition on 10 September, and signed the Declaration of Principles on 13 September President Clinton disagreed with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu 's policy of expanding Jewish settlements in the occupied territories, and it was reported that the President believed that the Prime Minister delayed the peace process.
President Clinton hosted negotiations at the Wye River Conference Center in Maryland, ending with the signing of an agreement on 23 October Israel suspended implementation of the Wye agreement in early Decemberwhen the Palestinians violated the Wye Agreement by threatening to declare a state Palestinian statehood was not mentioned in Wye. Ehud Barak was elected Prime Minister on 17 Mayand won a vote of confidence for his government on 6 July President Clinton and Prime Minister Barak appeared to establish close personal relations during four days of meetings between 15 and 20 July.
The US-Israeli relationship faces a storm on the horizon | Michael H Fuchs | Opinion | The Guardian
Bush administration — Mahmoud AbbasGeorge W. On 4 Octobershortly after the September 11 attacksSharon accused the Bush Administration of appeasing the Palestinians at Israel's expense in a bid for Arab support for the US anti-terror campaign. The White House said that the remark was unacceptable. Rather than apologize for the remark, Sharon said that the United States failed to understand him. Also, the United States criticized the Israeli practice of assassinating Palestinians believed to be engaged in terrorism, which appeared to some Israelis to be inconsistent with the US policy of pursuing Osama bin Laden "dead or alive".