Opportunities exist for improving rural livelihoods in Cambodia through the export of Khmer Rouge; () patron-client relations and an embedded culture of infrastructure, a limited skill base, or random events such as bad weather . true of relationships in which the patron regards the client's aircraft had been observing weather patterns, Eisenhower came clean and accepted full 34 George Lardner, Jr., ―Afghan, Cambodia Aid Cut: Conferees'. create by way of the continuing prevalence of patron–client relations, which, Rather, the poor in Cambodia continue to face the same precarious situation that they Of course, the problem is that while the elites may easily weather these.
The Mekong and the Tonle Sap dominate the life and economy of Cambodia. The Mekong overflows during the rainy season, deposits vast quantities of alluvial soil, and, backing toward the Tonle Sap, causes that lake to increase in size from about 2, sq km sq mi to almost 24, sq km 9, sq mi. Rainfall averages — cm 50—55 in in the central basin to about cm in in the southwestern mountains. There are palm, rubber, coconut, kapok, mango, banana, and orange trees, as well as the high sharp grass of the savannas.
Birds, including cranes, pheasants, and wild ducks, and mammals such as elephants, wild oxen, panthers, and bears abound throughout the country.
Fish, snakes, and insects also are present in abundance. As ofthere were at least species of mammals and species of birds in the country. Bylogging activities, the clearing of the land for agricultural purposes, and the damage from the Vietnam war resulted in the destruction of square miles of forest land.
Between andthe nation's forest and woodland were reduced by an additional Inthere were only 9 million ha. The nation has Most rural dwellers do not have access to pure water. Three-fourths of Cambodia's wildlife areas have been lost through the destruction of its forests, and strip mining for gems in the western part of the country poses an additional threat to the nation's biodiversity and wildlife habitats.
Natural fisheries have been endangered by the destruction of Cambodia's mangrove swamps. Inabout There are three Ramsar wetlands sites. According to a report issued by the International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources IUCNthreatened species included 23 types of mammals, 24 species of birds, 10 types of reptiles, 3 species of amphibians, 12 species of fish, and 31 species of plants.
Endangered species in Cambodia include three species of gibbon pileated, crowned, and capedseveral species of wild dog and wild cat, leopard, tiger, Asian elephantSumatran rhinocerosThailand brow-antlered deer, kouprey, giant catfish, Indian python, Siamese crocodile, and estuarine crocodile.
Climate and Vegetation
There were 94 males for every females in the country. According to the UN, the annual population growth rate for —10 was expected to be 2. Inthe government launched a National Population Policy, aimed at educating the population on the connections between high fertility, high population growth, and poverty.
The projected population for the year was 18, The population density was 74 per sq km per sq mi. The capital city, Phnom Penhhad a population of 1, in that year. Estimates of Cambodia's population vary with the assessment of the impact of the —75 war and the millions killed in its tumultuous aftermath.
At the war's end, in Aprilthe population of the capital, Phnom Penh, had swollen to nearly 3 million because of a mass influx of refugees. The new government immediately embarked on a forced evacuation of all urban areas, and by Marchonly ,—, were thought to remain in Phnom Penh.
MIGRATION The first migration of persons in independent Cambodia took place during the s and s, when ethnic Chinese were permitted to settle in the mountainous and wasteland areas and cultivate land that otherwise would have remained unproductive.
AfteraboutVietnamese living in Cambodia were repatriated to the Vietnam ostensibly as a security measure. With the insurgent victory in Aprilmost of the country's remaining Vietnamese were reported to have emigrated to Vietnam.
In addition, thousands of refugees, including many former officials and military personnel, fled across the Thai border or were evacuated by US aircraft.
The new government launched a sweeping nationwide resettlement program under which some 2. The food shortage in rural areas was only slightly less critical than in the cities, and widespread starvation led to the deaths of an estimated one million people during the transition. After the installation of the new government in Januarycontinued fighting and political instability resulted in a new exodus of refugees. AboutCambodians left the country between andof which aboutwere able to resettle in other countries, includingin the United States.
Most of the rest remained in camps on the border with Thailand, but they were repatriated to Cambodia in May Between and there was a new migration of ethnic Vietnamese into Cambodia. Official sources insisted that the total number was under 60, and was comprised, for the most part, of residents who had left in the early s; opposition groups contended that the number totaled overand was intended to consolidate Vietnamese control over the country.
Inthe conflicts between government forces and the National Army of Democratic Kampuchea Khmer Rouge drove rural populations from their homes. Also inthe UNHCR helped several thousand ethnic Vietnamese fisher families return to their Cambodian homes after having camped on the Vietnam border.
Following the peace settlement between the government of Cambodia and resistance forces in Decemberthe repatriation of approximately 36, refugees remaining in camps in Thailand was rapidly implemented. By Aprilall of the camps were closed, and by June some 47, refugees had returned home. In there werenoncitizen residents living in Cambodia. In Cambodia as ofpeople were registered as refugees and another were registered as asylum seekers.
Documentation Center of Cambodia,chapter 1. The Importance of Reciprocity It is precisely this type of reciprocity that distinguishes patron-client dyads from relationships based on coercion or formal authority. There is little evidence that Beijing has attempted to compel Cambodian allegiance through economic threats and no evidence of military coercion.
As it has done throughout the region, China has relied more heavily on inducement to pursue stronger ties with Cambodia. As the literature on social exchange theory suggests, power inequality in reciprocal relationships does not necessarily translate into an exchange of benefits that favors the stronger state. The stronger state typically earns access to resources and deference on certain diplomatic matters. When a great power is eager to build consensual friendships, its weaker partner may be able to extract considerable rewards while conceding little policy deference—or at least deference that carries low political costs.
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In such cases, an asymmetric bond can become quite strong without generating charges that the small state is a lackey. The risk of diminished policy autonomy is a key reason why leaders of small developing states are generally wary of entering into close asymmetric relationships with great powers. Most such leaders preside over societies that have suffered from colonial rule and subsequent imperial intrusion, leading them to prize their sovereignty and understand the risks of dependence.
Cambodia is a case in point. Throughout its history, Cambodia has struggled with foreign intrusion. Centuries of Siamese and Vietnamese encroachment were followed by seven decades of French rule.Village Cambodian Food - AMAZING Cooking Curry Over Fire in Kampong Cham - Travel in Cambodia!
When Cambodia finally won its independence from France init became the site of an elaborate proxy war marked by frequent foreign intervention and a decade of Vietnamese occupation. The answer is twofold: China has been willing and able to provide economic and political benefits prized by the incumbent Cambodian leadership and, until quite recently, Beijing has not demanded costly forms of policy deference from Cambodia in return.
Although China provides substantial economic aid to Cambodia, which reciprocates to some degree with policy deference, the bidirectional flow of benefits is more complex than a simple aid-for-influence swap. China also derives important economic benefits from the relationship, and the Cambodian government gets more than money for development— it gets assistance in a form that reinforces elite positions in the domestic political economy and buttresses the government against domestic and foreign critics.
The Forms of Chinese Patronage Cambodian decision-makers have derived a number of benefits from their partnership with China. The most obvious are economic. The relationship has also had related domestic political, diplomatic, and security payoffs for Phnom Penh. Both of these industries, however, require costly energy and infrastructure improvements.
Cambodia, available at http: China is also willing to undertake projects that other donors are not. While Cambodia remains a minor trading partner for China—accounting for less than 0. Political Consolidation and the Neopatrimonial State Cambodian elites have profited handsomely from Chinese economic engagement, both in pecuniary and political terms, because the political and economic systems in Cambodia are so closely intertwined.
His military, economic, and political levers of power are closely intertwined. Decisions are made by a relatively small number of elite officials and business tycoons connected closely to them through blood, marriage, and shared business interests.
Many of the decision-makers are ethnic Chinese who have built some trust with Chinese counterparts due to cultural and linguistic affinity. ADB,p. These numbers almost certainly understate the true volume of trade due to the prevalence of illicit commerce in lumber and other commodities. The CPP also has used business licenses and lucrative government positions to win the allegiance of key elite constituencies, who channel funds back toward the top of the pyramid of patronage.
University of California Press,pp. State Department, Fact Sheet on U. Hun Sen and the CPP enjoy genuine appeal in the countryside for delivering relative peace and stability—and more recently uneven but significant economic growth—to Cambodia. But their control over the flow of money through key patronage networks remains an important pillar of their political power. China has been more than willing to acquiesce in those arrangements. Chinese willingness to engage in corrupt practices has also strengthened the link, as Cambodian officials take payment from the Chinese for licenses, permits, and contracts.
InCambodia ranked th out of states in the annual Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index. Within Asia, only Myanmar was lower. Funcinpec has since receded as a viable opposition party in Cambodia, but Western governments and the populations of expatriate Khmers in Western states continue to support opposition parties.
The CPP has co-opted some of its opponents but has used violence and intimidation to weaken others—as in cases such as the murder of labor activist Chea Vichea. For the CPP, there are few if any alternatives to China.
Vietnam is also not a viable alternative. Opposition parties have long sought to characterize the CPP as Vietnamese puppets—a charge deeply resonant in a country that was occupied for a decade by Vietnamese troops.
For example, the World Bank ceased lending to Cambodia in due to flooding and forced evictions of villagers in the area of a development project to fill the Boueng Kak Lake in Phnom Penh. Rather than address the remedy the situation, Cambodia simply turned to China to finance the project. In NovemberU. The Cambodians, for their part, have long tried to play off these competing powers against one another in order to advance their own interests.
In these equations, the role of China is pivotal, as it expands its influence in the region. In Cambodia, the Chinese have been particularly successful given USG reticence in the past to engage more energetically with the Cambodian government. The United States is not the only country to court Phnom Penh with an eye toward countering Chinese influence. Japan has provided tens of millions of dollars to the Cambodian government in support of the Khmer Rouge tribunal,65 along with other aid that some analysts perceive as part of a broader effort to balance Chinese political clout in Cambodia.
Ciorciari and Anne Heindel, Hybrid Justice: University of Michigan Press, forthcomingchapters 1 and 3. There is some realist, balance-of-threat logic to Sino-Cambodian security cooperation. Historically, both countries have sought to avoid encirclement by hostile neighbors. China has long been fearful of encirclement by rival great powers such as the United States and Soviet Union and their allies along the Pacific Rim, including the Indochinese states.
Border and maritime disputes with Vietnam and Thailand—most notably over the temple of Preah Vihear—give Cambodian leaders reason to seek external support. The contemporary Sino-Cambodian relationship is much more modest from a defense standpoint. The two states have no formal alliance or agreement on mutual defense, and their informal security ties are quite limited. These helicopters transport up to 8 troops and are typically used for search and rescue operations.
Even in the period between andwhen the Thai army posed a clear threat to Cambodian territorial interests and clashed with the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces RCAF over the temple of Preah Vihear, China did not intervene visibly. Perhaps this is due partly to the partnership China has enjoyed with the Thai military since the end of the Vietnam War.
If Cambodian leaders seek strong Chinese protection against Thailand through arms or explicit diplomatic intervention, they have likely been disappointed. Rather than attempting to arm Cambodia heavily, China has used military aid as a sign of political support.
Less than three weeks later, China donated military trucks to Cambodia to compensate Cambodia for the loss of the U. The Myth of Unconditional Aid A common refrain in analysis of Chinese relations with Cambodia—and many other states in the Global South—is that Beijing curries favor by providing unconditional aid.
Cambodian officials often stress their appreciation for Chinese non- interference. They build bridges and roads and there are no complicated conditions. The implicit conditions China attaches are quite different than the strings attached to grants and loans from the Bretton Woods institutions or major Western capitals. Loans from the World Bank, Asian Development Bank, and Japanese and Western donors typically feature numerous conditions and disbursement triggers pertaining to matters including project transparency, environmental and social assessments, labor rights, and broader economic policies.
Chinese aid packages come without explicit policy conditions, but not without expectations of reciprocity. Claims on both sides to the contrary are insincere.
The main difference between Chinese and Western aid is that the implicit conditions China attaches generally have been the types that CPP leaders are more willing to fulfill.
A leaked cable from the U. Embassy in Phnom Penh asserted: Inthe U.